In 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) issued its federal prosecutors a written set of guidelines to assist them in their investigation and prosecution of white collar corporate crime. Specifically, these guidelines, issued in a document commonly known as the Thompson Memorandum, addressed the question of whether and under what circumstances Assistant U.S. Attorneys (“AUSAs”) conducting investigations into white collar crimes committed by employees and executives should bring a formal charge against the company itself. The Thompson Memo listed nine separate factors for prosecutors to evaluate when making the decision of whether or not to seek an indictment.
"Principles-based" or "rules-based," that is the question. In the last year, there has been significant debate over how regulation in the financial services industry should be patterned. The United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority has been a leader in this debate, declaring strong commitment to a principles-based system.
William E. Donnelly and Robert Howard co-authored an article in the Review of Securities & Commodities Regulation,"Brokers Beware: Elder Law Issues Become Increasingly Significant to Securities Firms."
Brokers Beware: Elder Law Issues Become Increasingly Significant to Securities Firms, 40 Rev. SEC. & COMM. REG. No. 19.
“Recent Developments in Compliance” Panel, SIFMA Compliance and Legal Division Regional Seminar, Washington, DC.
"Key Components of an Effective Compliance Program for Broker-Dealers Deemed Trading Centres Under Regulation NMS," Journal of Securities Compliance.
For over three decades, applicable regulations have provided investors with an absolute right to have their disputes arbitrated.6 Investment firms have gained the same right in return by entering into predispute arbitration agreements with their new customers. Such contracts ensure that both sides are treated fairly and effectuate the public policy in favor of predispute arbitration agreements that has been recognized by both Congress and the United States Supreme Court.7 Opponents of predispute arbitration agreements, however, seek neither fairness nor equality; rather, they seek an unfair strategic advantage. They want investors to retain their right to arbitrate as they see fit, but to deprive investment firms of the same right.